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Abstract. The use of Decision Support Systems (DSS) in the field of
Electricity Markets (EM) is essential to provide strategic support to its
players. EM are constantly changing, dynamic environments, with many
entities which give them a particularly complex nature. There are several
simulators for this purpose, including Bilateral Contracting. However,
a gap is noticeable in the pre-negotiation phase of energy transactions,
particularly in gathering information on opposing negotiators. This paper
presents an overview of existing tools for decision support to the Bilateral
Contracting in EM, and proposes a new tool that addresses the identified
gap, using concepts related to automated negotiation, game theory and
data mining.
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1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the EM have undergone a profound
restructuring, proceeding to its liberalization. Therefore, EM became more com-
petitive, but also more complex, resulting in increased unpredictability[1].
Nowadays, new challenges arise regarding the increasing usage of energy from
renewable sources. The European Union (EU) has defined a set of policies and
standards that contribute to the large-scale implementation of distributed gen-
eration, in order to encourage and increase the use of this type of energy. An
example would be the ”20-20-20” program [2]. However, the usage of this energy
type introduces a new source of unpredictability in the sector, due to its inter-
mittent nature. As such, the unpredictability and risk in the EM are increasingly
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higher, considering the great complexity of the interaction between its partici-
pating entities and the large number of associated variables, which hinder the
decision-making process. In this context, EM simulation proves to be a great
tool for decision support, through the study of the inherent mechanisms of these
markets as well as the relations between the entities (players), by analysing their
profiles, behaviours and strategies [3]. Although there are several EM simulators,
few are the ones that provide support for negotiation among players.
This paper intends to address the identified gap, aiming to propose a solution
that allows participating agents to obtain the best possible results, considering
their objectives. As such, it’s considered a Decision Support System (DSS) for
bilateral contracts, including methodologies for the pre-negotiation phase, par-
ticularly in the profile analysis of opposing negotiators. This way, it allows adapt-
ability of the negotiation strategies, which together with a contextual analysis,
gives the capability to analyse and identify different contexts of negotiation.
This paper is divided into five sections: Bilateral Contracts in Electricity
Markets, Multi-Agent Simulators as Decision Support Systems in Electricity
Markets, Proposal, Experimental Findings and Conclusions.
2 Bilateral Contracts in Electricity Markets
EM are constantly evolving and adapting. Currently, most countries have their
own market or participate in regional markets, together with neighbouring coun-
tries [4]. EM are composed of several market types [5, 6], based on three different
models, which are (I) day-ahead spot, (II) intra-day, both usually auction based,
and (III) bilateral contracts models.
In the scope of EM, bilateral contracts are long-term contracts established
between two entities, buyer and seller, for energy transaction, without the in-
volvement of a third entity. The transaction is usually carried out several weeks
or months after the contract is made [7] and usually has the following specifi-
cations: start and end dates and times; Price per hour (e/MWh) and amount
of energy (MW), variable throughout the contract and, finally, a range of hours
relative to the delivery of the contract. Players can use customized long-term
contracts, trading ”over the counter” and electronic trading to conduct bilat-
eral transactions [8]. There are four types of bilateral contracts: the first type
are Forward Contracts, that consist in energy exchange between a buyer and
a seller for a future date, for the price negotiated at that moment; the second
type are Future Contracts, which are similar to Forward Contracts except that
they are managed by a third party responsible for ensuring compliance with the
agreement; the third type are Option Contracts, that are similar to the Forward
and Future contracts with the difference that the two entities only guarantee a
buy/sell option; the last one are Contracts for Difference, that allows entities
concerned to protect themselves from the energy price change between the date
of establishment of the agreement and the agreed date of exchange.
With the exception of Contracts for Difference, this type of negotiation allows







what happens in spot markets, due to the proposals’ instability. In establishing
a Forward or Future contract, players are committing themselves to transact
energy for a given price at a future time, with the risk of making a transaction
at a lower price than the expected and lose competitive power. Option Contracts
or Contracts for Difference can avoid this risk. The first allows the player to
choose not to go through with the exchange while the second ensures that the
transaction is carried out at the market price. However, the first option also has
the risk of not guaranteeing whether or not the other party will exercise their
option to exchange and the second option does not allow better prices than
the market. This way, it is possible to understand the risk associated with the
negotiation of bilateral contracts and the need that players have of tools that
help them reduce this risk and even optimize their profits.
3 Multi-Agent Simulators as Decision Support Systems
in Electricity Markets
The vast majority of EM simulators are focused only on market analysis and are
void of mechanisms that allow their users to get support for direct negotiation.
Particularly with bilateral contracts, there are gaps in decision support systems,
namely in obtaining information about the opposing party [9]. This leads to an
urgent need to acquire new methods that support the decision process, such as
the definition of suitable models, choice of the best candidates to close the deal,
analysis of the previous transactions of these candidates and strategies to employ
to get the best deal possible. One of the main advantages of using MAS for the
implementation of these simulators is that they have software agents that, by
definition, interact with each other autonomously in order to meet an objective
[10].
Table 1. Phases of Automated Negotiation problems (Adapted from [9])
Group Component or Dimension
Preliminaries – Social conflict (detection and exploration)
– Negotiating parties (number of parties)
Pre-Negotiation – Structuring of personal information (definition and exe-
cution of key pre-negotiation tasks)
– Analysis of the opponents
– Protocol and selection of the initial strategy
Actual Negotiation – Exchange of offers and feedback information
– Argumentation (threats, promises, etc.)
– Learning (in negotiation)
– Dynamic strategic choice (new strategies)
– Impasse resolution







In the literature, it is possible to find references to systems that allow the
simulation of bilateral contracts in the context of EM. Some examples are The
Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System (EMCAS) [11], The Multi-Agent
Negotiation and Risk Management in Electricity Markets (MAN-REM) [9] and
The General Environment for Negotiation with Intelligent Multi-purpose Usage
Simulation (GENIUS) [12]. These simulators are based on phased negotiation ap-
proaches, following the ideology of automated negotiation (see Table 1), namely
in the definition of the pre-negotiation, actual negotiation and analysis of the
results in order to adjust future proposals. However, these simulators do not
respond to the problem already identified, that is, in the pre-negotiation phase,
a detailed study of the characteristics of possible opponents does not occur, in
order to perceive which are best suited to their objectives and which negotia-
tion strategies should be used with each one of them, in order to close the best
possible deal.
4 Proposal
This DSS focused on the Pre-Negotiation phase, joining the Preliminary and
Pre-Negotiation phases of automated negotiation. This union simplifies the sys-
tem given the proximity of the two phases, being joined in most models. The
DSS is intended to support an agent who intends to transact energy with other
agents through bilateral contracts. The agent supported by this system may be
any type of entity interested in transactions within the electricity markets. The
agent will use the system whenever it intends to enter new bilateral contracts
and wish to guarantee the maximum possible gain. When an agent pretends to
enter into a bilateral contract market, it can find more than one competitor.
Weighted competitor choice is very important when maximizing profits. More-
over, this decision does not necessarily fall on the competitor who can offer the
best proposals. The competitor’s ability to comply with the agreement is a very
important factor. The fulfilment of agreements, however promising they may be,
with competitors who fail to do their part ends up being a great waste of time
for the agent and compromising his management.
For decision support in this stage of negotiation, the system uses a scenario
analysis method based on game theory. The outputs of this method are the choice
of the most favourable competitors, the distribution of the amount of energy, to
be negotiated with each of the selected competitors, which guarantees greater
profit, and the price that each competitor is expected to show.
As can be seen in Fig.1, the proposed method is composed of three parts:
Scenarios Definition, Possible Actions Definition and Decision Process. The Sce-
narios Definition consists in the specification of the different negotiation scenarios
that the supported agent can find. The results of the potential competitors in the
past are analysed and, by means of forecast algorithms, the prices of the com-
petitors, for different amounts of energy, are forecast. When there is not enough
history to make forecasts, an estimation process is necessary. The Possible Ac-







Fig. 1. Diagram of proposed methodology
agent can take. The total energy to be negotiated with each competitor is de-
termined through a recursive process to exploit all possibilities. The last part,
Decision Process, is composed by the choice of competitors to negotiate with,
the respective amounts of energy and the expected prices. For this purpose, a
game theory approach is used to evaluate the potential outcome of each scenario-
action combination through a utility function. The appraisal also considers the
reputation of each competitor and also uses a learning process, which allows to
know which scenarios are most likely to occur in each context.
Concerning the user’s interaction with the system, a graphical interface is
available, allowing the user to enter his objectives and his possible competi-
tors, obtaining the ideal solution (the quantities to be negotiated with certain
competitors and the expected prices) coupled with an explanation of the results.
5 Experimental Findings
This section presents a case study that allows the evaluation of the proposed
tool’s operation. In order to facilitate the analysis of results, it’s considered a
simple scenario in which the supported player intends to buy 10 MW in a week-
day context. In order to obtain decision support on the opponents to negotiate,
and corresponding quantities, the supported player indicates the 5 players that
it can negotiate with. From his point of view, the calculation of each opponent’s
reputation should have as much importance to his personal opinion as the social
opinion. The social opinion itself will be calculated giving the same weight to
the supported group’s members’ opinion, as well as the group of each target
player. The decision method to be used is the Most Probable, which selects the







learning module. Finally, regarding the risk value, several tests will be carried
out in order to perceive its impact.
In the first stage, a forecast is performed to obtain the price that each op-
ponent may propose, considering their contracts history. In case of unsufficient
data to forecast the price for a given quantity, a value is estimated, considering
the price forecasts for the other quantities. Fig. 2 shows the forecast results.
Fig. 2. Opponents expected price per energy amount
Supported by the data in the application’s database, it was possible to fore-
cast the expected prices for all quantities for all opponents, with the exception
of the 10 MW quantity. The estimation made for this quantity shows prices close
to those presented in the remaining amounts of energy, except for the estimated
price for Player 4. In this case, there is a deviation from his normal behaviour
due to forecasts of quantities exceeding 10 MW, which presented a significant
downward trend. Taking into account the results of the forecast phase, Player
4 presents the best selling price, precisely for the amount of energy that the
supported player intends to acquire. However, the final decision will also depend
on each opponent’s reputation (see Table 2).
Table 2. Reputation of the opponents
Player ID 1 2 3 4 5
Reputation 0.275 0.575 0.125 0.325 0.425
As it can be seen in Table 2, the player with the highest reputation is Player
2, followed by Player 5 and then Player 4 (player with the best selling price).
Depending on the player’s propensity to risk, reputation may not favour Player
4 against Players 2 and 5 who, despite not having such attractive sales prices,







ported player can take, all possible actions are generated and the utility value of
each one is calculated. The range of possible actions are the maximum number
of different power distributions by the various opponents, from trading 10MW
with only one player, to trading the same amount, but divided by several players
(Example: 6MW with one player and 1MW with each of the remaining). The
actions’ utility value combines the reputation of the players to trade in that
action, with the economic advantage it can bring to the supported player. The
two components’ weight varies depending on the supported player’s risk propen-
sity. The risk value ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 is the minimum risk and only
the reputation component is considered and 1 is the maximum risk, where only
the economic component is considered. The number of possible distributions of
10MW per 5 players is 1001, a very high number, considering the amounts of
energy and possible opponents in question. Through the Most Probable decision
method, it was possible to obtain the negotiation recommendations presented in
Fig. 3, for different risk levels.
Fig. 3. Actions for different risks
Figure 3 shows that in case of risk 0, that is, each action is evaluated only
by the reputation of the players involved, it’s recommended to transact all the
energy with Player 2, the player with the highest reputation. By increasing the
risk to 0.25, it’s no longer advisable to negotiate all power with Player 2. The
supported player should only transact 8MW with Player 2 and 2MW with Player
5 (second highest reputation). In this case, some security is abandoned in favour
of a more economically advantageous transaction. This is followed by a case
where the risk value is 0.5, where the reputational component is as important as
the economic component. In this case, since Player 4 has a superior advantage in
the economic component than Players 2 and 5 in the reputation component, he’s
selected to transact the 10MW. Being Player 4 in advantage, the risk increase,
favouring the economic component, will keep the recommendation in his favour.
Through this case study it is possible to perceive the advantages that a player,
intending to make bilateral contracts, may have when using this decision support







player’s expectations and presents the best solution in the middle of a very high
number of possible actions in a large number of scenarios that would otherwise
be practically impossible to achieve.
6 Conclusions
The paper presents a state of art for bilateral contracting in EM as well as
acknowledgement of automated negotiation as the main strategy for modelling
this type of simulators. It was concluded that the simulators seek to follow the
automated negotiation phases, but present weaknesses in not exploring the infor-
mation of the opposing traders in the pre-negotiation. Thus, a DSS that proposes
a solution to the identified problem is presented, which uses data mining tech-
niques and game theory to select the players with whom they intend to negotiate,
fulfilling their requirements. A study was performed in order to demonstrate the
advantages of the tool for the decision maker.
As future work, alternative approaches to the Possible Actions phase will be
considered, to present an higher performance while keeping the quality of results.
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